Background Cryptosporidium is a major cause of gastroenteritis (cryptosporidiosis). Case and outbreak report rates vary geographically, which may in part reflect public health practice.
Background
Cryptosporidiosis is the gastrointestinal disease caused by the protozoan parasite Cryptosporidium. Transmission is faecal-oral by person-to-person or animal-to-person contact, or through ingestion of contaminated water and food. The incubation period is usually between 3 and 12 days depending on dose, host age and immunity. 1 The main symptoms are watery diarrhoea, abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting and low-grade fever, lasting from days to weeks before resolving. 1 In about one-third of cases, symptoms may relapse and remit during the patent period.
2 Transmission can therefore continue for some time before clusters of cases are detected by public health officials. 1, 3 In some immunocompromised people, infection may result in significant morbidity and mortality. 4, 5 Although nitazoxanide is licensed in the USA, there is no specific licensed therapy in the European Union. 6 In England and Wales, Cryptosporidium is the commonest protozoan cause of acute gastroenteritis, with around 4000 reported cases annually (7.5 per 100 000 population). and under-reported. 8 One UK-wide study estimated the annual incidence to be 69.5 cases per 100 000 population. 9 Between 1992 when structured outbreak surveillance began 10 and the end of 2012, a total of 198 cryptosporidiosis outbreaks were reported in England and Wales, nearly half of which (95/198) were linked to recreational waters (mainly swimming pools), 48 to farm visits, 26 to drinking water and 29 involved other vehicles of infection or settings including day-care nurseries (Public Health England, unpublished data). The main risks during farm visits are contact with young lambs, calves or goats and lack of adequate hand hygiene. 11, 12 Enhanced surveillance has shown that Cryptosporidium outbreaks, especially small ones, are underdetected and under-reported which might, through their frequency, contribute significantly to the disease burden. 13 Cryptosporidiosis should be considered by clinicians in all cases of acute gastroenteritis, particularly in young children and especially if the symptoms are prolonged. 14 Although laboratory testing is not mandatory in the UK, stools from all symptomatic individuals should be tested for Cryptosporidium. 15, 16 Notification of laboratory confirmation to local health protection services is a statutory requirement, and the responsibility for the investigation of cases and outbreaks in England and Wales falls jointly to Local Authorities (LAs) and the Health Protection Teams (HPTs). 17 Public health management is focussed on prompt action and risk reduction to prevent further cases, including interruption of secondary transmission through enteric precautions and exclusions. 18 Guidance for the investigation of Cryptosporidium cases and outbreaks was issued in response to outbreaks linked to drinking water. 19 Although the number of mains drinking waterborne outbreaks has declined in the UK following improvements in water quality, outbreaks linked to swimming pools have become more common, probably due to greater recognition and improved investigations, 20 necessitating specific guidance. 21 To assess practices across England and Wales and inform recommendations, we undertook an audit of practice for the recording, investigation and public health management of Cryptosporidium cases.
Methods

Data collection and statistical analysis
In September 2014, a link to an online structured questionnaire provided by SelectSurevy.NET (https://selectsurvey. net) was emailed to all HPTs in England (n = 25) and Wales (n = 3) (Supplementary document available online). Up to three reminders were sent and the survey was closed on 24 October 2014.
To gauge the amount of involvement in investigation of Cryptosporidium cases by each HPT between April 2013 and March 2014, the numbers of laboratory confirmed cases, outbreaks, and outbreak-associated cases, and the outbreak settings or vehicles were documented. HPTs indicated whether case numbers were as expected. The survey covered exceedance monitoring processes and methods for obtaining, storing and analysing risk-factor data.
Practices and numbers of reported outbreaks at each HPT were compared by two-tailed Fisher's exact test. P values of ≤0.05 were considered significant.
Swimming pool and drinking water contamination scenarios
To further gauge current practice and awareness for the management of cryptosporidiosis, two scenarios were described. In the first, single Cryptosporidium reports were received by an HPT on two consecutive days; both cases swam regularly at the same leisure centre pool and had swum within the incubation period for Cryptosporidium. HPTs were asked for their response time, actions taken and by whom.
Scenario 2 described a cluster of 10 cases identified in a 2-week period among residents on the same mains drinking water supply. There were no other explanations for the cluster and the water company had reported the detection of Cryptosporidium in the treated water. HPTs were asked if they would implement advice based on this information, and if so, what advice and to whom.
HPTs were asked to identify any personnel (job roles), guidance documents, websites or other sources of information they would consult to inform their decisions. Practice was compared with national guidance.
Results
Data collection
Twenty-four of the 28 (86%) HPTs responded to the questionnaire (Table 1 ). In the previous year, the HPTs were notified of a total of 3526 laboratory confirmed cases (range 13-366 per HPT, mean 147, median 116). The number of cases was as expected in 18 (75%) responding HPTs (range 13-290 cases per HPT), but 3 HPTs had fewer and 3 had more cases than expected (Table 1) .
There were 29 outbreaks investigated by 14 HPTs (range 1-4 per HPT). One outbreak was co-investigated by two HPTs because the cases and premises involved were in different areas (Table 1) . Only 264 of the 3526 (7.5%) confirmed cases were recognized as being part of an outbreak.
Outbreaks involved known Cryptosporidium risks: recreational waters, mainly swimming pools (n = 10); animal contact, mainly at open farms (n = 14); day-care nurseries (n = 2); mains drinking water (n = 1); a school (n = 1) and one occurred among naval personnel during a land-based exercise.
Nineteen (79%) HPTs had local exceedance monitoring based on one or more method: weekly monitoring of rolling averages (n = 11); SaTScan TM software that analyses spatial, temporal and space-time data 22 (n = 4; one in addition to weekly rolling averages monitoring); manual review (n = 3) and two where the method was not stated. Thirteen of the 19 (68%) HPTs that had exceedance monitoring reported one or more outbreaks compared with only 1 of 5 (20%) HPTs that did not (P = 0.12).
In 19 (79%) HPT areas, a risk-factor questionnaire was always administered to cases, usually by the LA (Fig. 1) . In five areas, questionnaires were administered only sometimes, either by the HPT, LA or shared between them (Fig. 1 ). Advice to patients was provided during administration of the questionnaire. Twelve of 19 (63%) HPTs that always administered a risk-factor questionnaire reported at least one outbreak compared with 2 of 5 (40%) that only sometimes administered a questionnaire (P = 0.67). a E = expected number of cases; <E = less than expected; >E = more than expected.
b An outbreak in the South Midlands where the investigation was led by Thames Valley.
Questionnaires were administered in different ways especially by the LAs: self-administration by post was the most common primary option (n = 13), followed by telephone (n = 7) and face-to-face interview (n = 1) (Fig. 1) . Online administration was also used in three areas, but only one used this as a regular secondary option, the others were as a pilot study or only in an outbreak (Fig. 1) .
Different questionnaires were used. In three HPT areas, this was a general gastrointestinal disease questionnaire. 23 In 21 areas, a Cryptosporidium-specific questionnaire was used: these varied, although most were based on that published in the Bouchier report. 19 In 17 instances, the HPT held the completed questionnaires (16 electronically and 1 as paper records); in 5, this was done by the HPT or LA (3 electronically and 2 paper) and in 2 HPT areas, the questionnaires were kept solely by the LAs and only sent to the HPT if an outbreak was suspected.
A structured system to detect common exposures was in place at 19 (79%) HPTs, of which 15 used HPZone (InFact UK Ltd), a web-based case management system used by Public Health England (PHE) whereby exposures identified in questionnaires as specific 'contexts' may be found subsequently by others entering another case with the same exposure information. In the other four HPTs, the system used was based on manual review on a regular (but variable) basis; three were in Wales where HPZone is not used. Fourteen of 19 (74%) HPTs with a structured system reported at least one outbreak compared with none of the five without a system (P = 0.01).
National guidelines were used by 23 (96%) HPTs for the investigation and management of cases. One HPT questioned the existence of national guidelines. One HPT reported that there were aspects they managed differently to national guidance, but did not elaborate. The national guidance used was: 
INVESTIGATION AND MANAGEMENT OF CRYPTOSPORIDIUM IN ENGLAND AND WALES
• Guidance on the Prevention of Person-to-Person Spread 18 • Guidance on Drinking Water Safety
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• PHE resources within HPZone • PHE guidance available online at https://www.gov.uk/ government/collections/cryptosporidiosis-guidance-dataand-analysis (last accessed 21 December 2016).
Twelve HPTs used their own local protocol and six provided this for review: all documented summaries of the initial HPT response and actions, the role of the LA and HPT, and initial information collection and follow-up plus quick reference for exclusions.
Swimming pool and drinking water contamination scenarios
In response to the swimming pool scenario, all 24 HPTs would respond to two cases: 22 within one working day and 2 within 2 days. Twenty-two would request that the LA visit and inspect the premises. Sixteen would start control measures, and 14 hold an incident control team meeting. Fourteen would ask the LA to sample the pool water, nine would not and one would seek advice. All HPTs reported they would, in collaboration with the LA, review the epidemiological data from other cases in relation to this exposure. Thirteen mentioned that they would use the published guidance for the investigation of cases linked to swimming pools. 21 In response to the second scenario, seven HPTs would consider advising a general notice to boil water for drinking, cooking or preparing food, of which two would remind immunocompromised patients to boil their drinking water routinely and one would promote the use of bottled water as an alternative to boiling. Two HPTs would consider a boil water notice appropriate at this stage, of which one would remind immunocompromised people to boil their drinking water routinely. Five HPTs would advise only immunocompromised people to boil their drinking water, of which one would provide the option to use bottled water. One HPT would advise bottled water for immunocompromised people or children. There was some variation in those considered immunocompromised or vulnerable, with two HPTs specifically mentioning oncology patients and one dialysis patients, bottle-fed infants and pregnant women.
Discussion
Main findings of this study Practices for the investigation and management of cryptosporidiosis varied across HPTs. There was a trend for association between practice and outcome, with outbreaks more commonly detected where local exceedance monitoring was in place, and where a risk-factor questionnaire was always administered compared with those that only sometimes did this. Various questionnaires were used which could mean that some exposures are not properly assessed and a common exposure may be missed. The use of general gastrointestinal questionnaires, designed to investigate bacterial infections such as Salmonella, was widespread but might miss common exposures such as swimming pools or ask about incubation periods inappropriate for Cryptosporidium.
Outbreaks were significantly more likely to be detected where a structured system to detect common exposures was in place. Practice on assigning 'contexts' in case management systems such as HPZone may be variable as the name of the context is not standardized. Routine post-coding is valuable in the identification of premises and is enabled by both HPZone and the Information Bureau for Infectious Disease (IBID) which went live in Wales in December 2013.
The method of administration of questionnaires varied and may impact response rates and the amount and quality of information gathered, but there is no current guidance for this. It is essential that the quality of advice is not dependent on who administers it.
Responses to the swimming pool scenario were largely in line with published guidance, which provides a checklist for inspections and indications for sampling for Cryptosporidium as this may not always be necessary for rapid public health interventions. 21 In response to the contaminated drinking water scenario, there was some variation in the people considered to be immunocompromised and needing specific advice, and lack of understanding that they should also boil bottled water: all water intended for consumption by specified immunocompromised individuals, including bottled water, should be boiled. 25 There was varied opinion about advising a general boil water notice; the responsibility for issuing warning notices to consumers lies with the water company. 24 The lack of awareness of national guidelines for the investigation and management of Cryptosporidium cases needs to be addressed. This finding in England and Wales, where there is an established public health infrastructure and internet-accessible guidelines, may also apply more widely. A review of waterborne outbreaks in Nordic countries concluded that although rare, they 'highlight the need for increased awareness in the public health sector, particularly of Cryptosporidium'.
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What is already known on this topic At a national level, exceedance monitoring was available across England via the Field Epidemiology Service teams using the Farrington model 27 giving expected values taking into account past and seasonal variation. However, this relies on analysis across large areas (regional or national) requiring relatively large exceedances and is insensitive to any but the largest of outbreaks. The addition of spatiotemporal cluster detection using SaTScan or other structured systems applied at a local level may identify additional localized outbreaks. 13 Although people with compromised T-cell function should boil all drinking water (including bottled water) to reduce the risk of infection, 25 a review published in 2002 concluded that the routine extension of boiling water advice is not warranted beyond those considered at raised risk of developing severe disease from Cryptosporidium who are: people with HIV infection who have CD4 counts <200/mm 3 , particularly if below 50/mm 3 ; people with primary T-cell deficiencies including, but not only, SCID and CD40 ligand deficiency (Hyper IgM Syndrome); and children with acute leukaemia or lymphoma. 4 Any particularly vulnerable people should be risk assessed and advised by their physician to take additional precautions as appropriate, although it is not currently clear whether this is common practice.
From an international perspective, Cryptosporidium outbreak reports are skewed towards industrialized countries, probably because the investment in the necessary infrastructure has enabled more focussed investigation and reporting 28 rather than a lack of disease since cryptosporidiosis is common in resource poor settings. 29 
What this study adds
This study provides the first national assessment of practices for the investigation and management of cryptosporidiosis and identifies a relationship with the recognition of outbreaks. Gathering exposure information from all cases and analysis of this and other surveillance data may increase outbreak detection. Awareness of national guidance needs to be improved. We expect our finding that structured outbreak detection systems contributed to more complete outbreak identification will also apply to other industrialized countries and likely also to surveillance established in more resource poor settings.
These findings form part of a review of Cryptosporidium by PHE and have been disseminated to HPTs, and presented at meetings including the five Nations Health Protection Conference in Cardiff in May 2016.
Limitations of this study
We only investigated associations between practice and numbers of outbreaks. We did not look at secondary spread, and it is unlikely that routinely collected data would enable this. We only looked at one year.
Since this audit was undertaken, we are aware that there have been some local changes in practice, but none that would change the conclusions or recommendations.
Conclusions
In order to fulfil the responsibilities HPTs and LAs have for the investigation of sporadic cases and outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis, there is a need for up-to-date joint standardized protocols with key principles for managing gastrointestinal infections. It is recommended that: local public health authorities use exceedance monitoring appropriate for their population; nationally agreed standardized questionnaires are produced that include time periods and questions taking into account the incubation period for Cryptosporidium (consideration should be given to how it can be efficiently administered to all cases); local public health authorities use a structured system to detect links between cases, and common exposures, including the use of postcodes and more standardized nomenclature for capturing context information; information about all cases should be shared between public health authorities, to enable identification and investigation of any institutions (e.g. school or nursery) or premises (e.g. swimming pools or open farms) mentioned by more than one case within one month; and investigations and advice for the prevention of spread, including exclusions, must be based on current guidance.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at the Journal of Public Health online.
